



NANSHAN
MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 2025

Background Guide

United Nations Security Council (1994)

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Welcome Letter

Dear delegates,

Welcome to Nanshan Model United Nations 2025 (NSMUN 2025). I'm Gino. My distinguished fellows, Thomas, Hank, and I will serve as the Chairs as well as consist of the Dais team throughout the conference. This year, we decided to hold a historical committee, with the topic, "**The Situation Concerning Rwanda**", and time set in March 1994 after a thorough consideration.

Convening an English-specialized committee, one of the three committees at the conference, has become a tradition of NSMUN. As we discussed how to "specialize" the committee, multiple aspects were taken into consideration, eventually shaping this conference just like our brainchild, we believe. After long discussions, the Security Council with the time set in the past became our prominent option.

Serving as one of the most powerful UN organs, the Security Council is, undoubtedly, the heart of emergency reaction in the international community. The overwhelming rights enshrined in the UN Charter, including commanding ceasefire, imposing sanctions, and taking military operations, make debate heated and caution especially required in the Security Council. In addition, the spicy voting mechanism and urgency of the issues require delegates' negotiating skills as well as prompt, legitimate, and accurate decisions, leaving this committee more challenging. Subsequently, having a look back on failures made by the Security Council in the past, the Rwanda Crisis came to our mind. The crisis, presumably, would have been preventable if the Security Council had made the right decision to stop it in time. However, the international indifference toward the issue eventually led to one of the most miserable tragedies in history.

Never could a historical committee reverse the time to prevent wars or humanitarian tragedies from happening. Nonetheless, history always sheds light on the right path in the future, making the possible tragedies avertable. Again, we sincerely welcome all the delegates to NSMUN 2025. On this historical journey, the fate of millions of Hutus and Tutsis is in your hands.

Best regards,

Gino, Yu-Nuo Chen

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**“In their greatest hours of need,
the world failed the people of
Rwanda.”**

— Kofi Annan

*This background guide will only provide information before March 1st and the situation before the designated timeline. (Namely, if there are terms like “at present, currently, lately, etc,” they actually mean the time of “1994”.) Hence, delegates are highly suggested to conduct further research to better adapt to the conference setting, while please be reminded that incidents happening after the settled time of the conference cannot be debated or referred to.

Abbreviation List

BBTG	Broad-Based Transitional Government
BNR	National Bank of Rwanda
CDR	Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
ECGLC	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
GoR	Government of Rwanda
JPMC	Joint Political Military Commission
MDR	Republican Democratic Movement
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
NMOG	Neutral Military Observers Group
NSMUN	Nanshan Model United Nations
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PL	Liberal Party
PSD	Social Democratic Party
RANU	Rwandese Alliance for National Unity
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTL	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
SRS	Special Representative of Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAR	Rwandese National Union
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

Conference Setting

The situation concerning Rwanda first came to the fore as the Rwanda Civil War broke out in 1990. Attributed to ethnic divisions, the Armed Forces of the mainly Hutu Government of Rwanda conflicted with the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbor, Uganda. The United Nations (UN) intervened in such incident in 1993. Due to the ongoing war, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) by passing Resolution 846 (1993).

The Security Council comprises five permanent members holding veto power (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America) and ten non-permanent members biannually elected by the General Assembly. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members without any negative votes by permanent members.

Enshrined with great power and responsibility to maintain peace, the Security Council can issue legally-binding resolutions to maintain peace and resolve disputes. To illustrate, the Security Council can resolve to enforce UN peacekeepers, consisting of military forces voluntarily provided by Member States, though the UN Charter did not explicitly refer to “peacekeeping operations.” Besides, the Security Council is also authorized to execute international sanctions as well as limited military action. Yet, the UN Charter reaffirms the overall duty of Member States to resolve disputes through peaceful means first. Only after the failure of the settlement can Member States refer it to the Security Council.

Chapter V: The Security Council

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

—*Charter of the United Nations Article 24(1)*

Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

—*Charter of the United Nations Articles 33(1), 33(2) and 37(1)*

Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

—*Charter of the United Nations Articles 41 and 42*

In October 1993, the Security Council established another international force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), by passing Resolution 872 (1993) to help implement the Arusha Accords signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993.¹ In accordance, UNAMIR shall have the following mandate:

- (a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city;*
- (b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures;*
- (c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;*
- (d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;*
- (e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;*
- (f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;*
- (g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations;*

¹ United Nations, "UNAMIR." <https://shorturl.at/ye2aq>

(h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police;

—*United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 (1993)*

Nevertheless, the mandate appeared to harbor loopholes that could cause certain issues. In January 1994, the UN Commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, sent a memo to the Security Council warning about the stockpile of weapons and an increase in violence between the Hutus and Tutsis. However, the warning went unheeded.² Within January and February 1994, there were increasingly violent demonstrations, roadblocks, assassination of political leaders and assaults on and murders of civilians. In late February, two prominent political leaders were assassinated, and a UNAMIR-escorted convoy was ambushed.³ Those indications exemplified the significance of adjusting the UNAMIR mandate.

To summarize, the situation would state that there ought to be discussions awaiting delegates' negotiation and solutions, such as but not limited to the enhancement of military operations, the necessity regarding additional personnel and equipment of the UNAMIR, and otherwise measures that the Security Council could deploy. In light of the aforementioned, this committee was thus convened on March 1 1994 to strive to address the crisis. That is to say, delegates please be reminded that this is a historical committee settled on 1 March 1994, which means only data before the designated date can be quoted during the three-day conference.

² College of Liberal Arts, "Rwanda." <https://shorturl.at/19K3U>

³ United Nations, "UNAMIR." <https://shorturl.at/0g51q>

Timeline of Events

Even if this is a historical committee, the Dais hopes that delegates can approach the issue with a comprehensive perspective. Thus, a historical timeline pertinent to this issue will be provided as follows. Although this seems like a “cheat sheet”, delegates, to digest the great complexity of this topic issue, are highly suggested to conduct further research instead of only browsing through the timeline.

Time (Year/Month)	Events
1884	The Berlin Conference established rules for European countries claiming possessions of Africa. Under those rules, Rwanda ended up under Germany’s control.
1918	After WWI, Germany lost all her colonies, and Belgium assumed control of Rwanda.
1959	Belgium’s “pro-Tutsi and anti-Hutu policies” caused an outbreak of a revolution led by the Hutu, named the Rwandan Revolution in history.
1962/7	Rwanda gained its independence. The Rwandan Revolution saw the country transition from a Tutsi monarchy under Belgian colonial authority to an independent Hutu-dominated republic and resulted in hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees.
1973/7	A Hutu leader named Juvenal F took over the government of Rwanda in a sudden takeover called a coup, meaning he became the leader of Rwanda without being elected.
1979/12	The Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) was created in December 1979 by some Tutsi intellectuals in Uganda because of the Rwandan Revolution.
1987/12	In December 1987, the RANU renamed itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and it became more powerful than the original RANU.
1990/10	Fighting between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF first broke out across the border of Rwanda and Uganda, named the Rwandan Civil War in history.

Time (Year/Month)	Events
1993/2	<p>The Government of Rwanda and Uganda ask help from the Security Council to deploy a panel of military observers to monitor the security of the border area.</p>
1993/3	<p>With the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania, the peace talk between the Government of Rwanda and Rwandese Patriotic Front was convened at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. In a joint declaration, both parties committed to reinstating the ceasefire on March 9, 1993.</p> <p>The Security Council passed Resolution 812 to request both parties to comply with the joint declaration mentioned above, including the commitment to a ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian aid, and return of the displaced person.</p>
1993/6/22	<p>The Security Council passed Resolution 846, contributing to the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) to monitor the common border of Uganda and Rwanda, and to verify that no military operation was taken in the area.</p>
1993/8/4	<p>The two parties, the government of Rwanda and the RPF, officially signed the Arusha Peace Agreement; meanwhile, they called for a neutral international force for the implementation of the agreement.</p>
1993/10/5	<p>The Security Council established a peacekeeping operation entitled “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)” by passing Resolution 872.</p>
1994/1~2	<p>The increasing frequency of violent demonstrations, roadblocks, and assassination of political leaders showed the unrest in Rwanda and the still-existing resentment between Hutus and Tutsis.</p>

History Background

1. Pre-colonial and Colonial-Era

The area of Rwanda is believed to have been initially settled by the Twa, who were closely followed by the Hutu, presumably between the 5th and 11th centuries, and then by the Tutsi beginning in the 14th century. In the early 1700s, traditions have it that there were eight kingdoms in Rwanda, and the Tutsi-led Kingdom of Rwanda quickly became dominant in the country. Historically, the impact of social differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi were profound for the conflict in the 20th century. The system of patron-client ties, namely “ubuhake”, gradually evolved into a class system that the Hutus became indentured servants to Tutsi lords, who offered them cattle and the use of land in exchange for service and farm produce.

The 1884 Berlin Conference on Western Africa established rules for European countries claiming possessions of Africa. Under those rules, the East Africa region, including Rwanda and Burundi, ended up under Germany’s control in 1899. Until 1919, when WWI ended, the German Empire saw Rwanda and Burundi being ceded to Belgium, as part of a League of Nations mandate (turning into a UN trust territory after WWII).⁴ Both German and Belgian colonists assumed that ethnicity should be clearly differentiated. They adopted the existing Hutu-Tutsi hierarchy and ruled that Rwandans with 10 or more cattle to be Tutsis, while others to be Hutus. In 1933, Belgium issued identity cards which pronounced each citizen Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa by measuring qualities such as height, length of nose and eye shape, based on the then-popular, though highly flawed, pseudo-sciences of anthropometry and physiognomy. In 1952, the Ten-Year Development Plan was implemented by Belgian colonizers⁵, aiming to promote political reform and social stability through economic and social reform. However, this in turn granted social and economic advantages to Tutsis. To sum up, as the European colonists viewed the Tutsi as more civilized, superior, but most importantly, more European than the Hutus, the Tutsis were granted preferential treatment in comparison, and the policy as regards “Tutsi racial superiority and Hutu oppression” lay the root of the antagonism between the two ethnicities.

Nevertheless, support from the European colonists began to shift from the Tutsi to the Hutu in the 1950s, when the Tutsi leadership agitated for speedy independence to enhance their power, and the Hutu elite called for the transfer of power from Tutsi to Hutu. The Rwandese National Union (UNAR) was created by Tutsi dignitaries and palace members for the sake of immediate independence under a hereditary Tutsi constitutional monarchy to take up government duties immediately. On the other hand, PARMEHUTU, a party of Hutu nationalists who fought for the emancipation of the "oppressed" Hutu majority, launched attacks on the Tutsi. Communal elections were held in 1960, resulting in a massive transfer of power to Hutu elements at the local level.

⁴ “The United Nations and Decolonization.” Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (1945-1999). <https://web.archive.org/web/20171006064439/http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselgov.shtml>.

⁵ “A Ten Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi : Belgium. Ministère Des Colonies : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming.” <https://archive.org/details/tenyearplanforth00belg/page/4/mode/2up>.

Tensions remained high, and local massacres of Tutsi continued throughout 1960 and 1961. Eventually, the Tutsi king was overthrown and Rwanda was declared a republic. On 1 July 1962, Rwanda became fully independent, and the Hutu assumed the presidency then.

2. Post-Independence Era

After independence, the Hutu-Tutsi relationship deteriorated, and the situation became unstable. This caused increasing conflicts such as the Bugesera invasion in 1963, with estimates of the death toll reaching as high as 20,000 Tutsi killed. Further massacres against Tutsis, in 1967 and 1973, were reported afterwards. Until 1964, the Rwanda Revolution had made up to 336,000 Tutsis flee to neighboring countries (Burundi, Uganda, Tanganyika and Congo-Léopoldville)⁶.

In 1973, a powerful Hutu leader named Juvenal Habyarimana (hereafter President Habyarimana) took over the government of Rwanda in a sudden takeover called a coup. This meant he became the leader of Rwanda without being elected. This event was a big turning point in Rwanda's history and led to a lot of changes in the country.⁷

In 1979, Tutsis exiled in Uganda established the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), which in 1987 changed into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (hereafter the RPF). With its upheld belief and armed forces to be reckoned with, the RPF was a rival to the Rwandan government. The unrest tension between the Hutu government and the RPF eventually burst into armed conflicts spanning decades.

By the end of the 1980s, the Habyarimana regime had come into a recession. The dropping price of coffee and the fact that the elites were drawing off funds and economic resources caused a severe crisis in the country and fueled discontent.⁸ In June 1990, French President François Mitterrand made a speech, announcing that French aid would be conditional upon democratization in Rwanda, after which the country experienced a slight opening up towards a multi-party system. Thus, on July 5, 1990, President Habyarimana was in a position to announce a political aggiornamento and the possibility of moving towards a multi-party system, though he remained very vague about the details of how this would be implemented.

3. Heralds of the Crisis

As indicated, ethnic hostilities deepened over time due to multifaceted factors and the unstable domestic situation, whereby the tense relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi reached its peak in the 1990s. Below are some key incidents implying that tensions conspicuously escalated and were likely to derive subsequent crises with greater severity from them.

⁶ Prunier, Gérard, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a genocide*.

⁷ Holocaust and genocide, "What Led to the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda?," CMHR, <https://shorturl.at/egV9v>.

⁸ Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network, "Rwanda - A Chronology (1867-1999)." <https://shorturl.at/6uT1g>.

A. Rwanda Civil War

In January 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda from its base in Uganda. In response, President Habyarimana claimed that the Tutsis enslaved the Hutus again, and thus, anti-Tutsi violence soared under his regime. Not until the Arusha Accords was signed in 1993 was a ceasefire reached temporarily. Nonetheless, this did not eradicate the increasing anti-Tutsi sentiment as Hutu-dominated media accused the Tutsi minority as a threat to Rwanda, causing Hutu extremists to spring up in intensity.⁹

B. Burundi Civil War

The Burundi Civil War broke out in October 1993. As aforementioned, Rwanda and Burundi were the same Rwanda-Urundi before their independence. The conflicts between Burundi Hutus and Tutsis were just as complicated as those in Rwanda. With the election that year being the last straw, the hatred ended up transforming into mass killing¹⁰.

C. Imported Arms

According to the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), there were up to 581,000 kilos of machetes imported from China and other countries, with a total value of 725,669 USD. These machetes were supposed to be for agricultural purposes. They, however, can be turned into deadly weapons for slaughter. Imports during 1991-1994 of machetes, hoes, pickaxes, picks, axes, billhooks, scythes, sickles and spades amounted to 4,671,533 USD.^{11 12}

It is suspicious that such a tremendous number of farming tools were imported when the country was in a tense state. The underlying purpose of these so-called farming equipment is open to interpretation.

D. Early 1994: Times of Chaos

President Habyarimana's term of office officially ended on December 31, 1993. But he soon took office on January 5, 1994. The little hope born out of the signing of the Arusha Accords was crushed, as the creation of the transitional government was postponed several times, attacks and assassinations proliferated, and the militias allied to the Hutu Power movement drew up lists of opponents to be targeted.¹³

On January 11, General Dallaire, who had received information from a former Interahamwe leader, warned the United Nations in New York of the existence of a plan for the systematic assassination of the Tutsi population,

⁹ Holocaust and genocide, "What Led to the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda?," CMHR, <https://shorturl.at/egV9v>.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, "Burundi." <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/burundi/burundi1201.pdf>.

¹¹ Michel Chossudovsky and Pierre Galand, "The Use of Rwanda's External Debt (1990-1994)," Global research, <http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO403E.html>.

¹² Michel Chossudovsky and Pierre Galand, "The Use of Rwanda's External Debt (1990-1994)," Global research, <http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO403E.html>.

¹³ HRW World Report 1999: Rwanda: Human rights developments. (n.d.). <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/africa/rwanda.html>

and of political opponents to President Habyarimana and to Hutu Power. A structure essentially based on the Interahamwe militias was ready to implement this plan. Dallaire requested permission to carry out search and disarmament operations.¹⁴

Numerous assassination and bomb attacks were carried out from January to March 1994. Victims included political leaders, civilians, and UNAMIR headquarters. These assassinations meant the explosion of hostilities.

¹⁴ Klabbers, J. (2017). Reflections on role responsibility: The responsibility of International Organizations for failing to Act.

Peace Talks & Peace Agreement

1. Pre-negotiation

Before the Arusha Talks convened in July 1992, efforts made by regional and international countries and organizations were noteworthy. As mentioned above, the RPF invaded Rwanda in October 1990, breaking out the fight with the government of Rwanda (GoR). A few days later, Belgium sent a delegation to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, in an attempt to resolve the conflict. In no time, the new conflict drew neighboring countries' attention. Regional summits were convened by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ECGLC¹⁵ to seek reconciliation of both sides. The N'sele ceasefire, the first ceasefire agreement during this session, committed both parties to the cessation of hostility. Notably, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) and the Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC) were established, as articulated in the ceasefire agreement:

Article III

The verification and control of the cease-fire shall be conducted by the neutral military observer group under the supervision of the Secretary-General of OAU.

Article IV

A Joint Political Military Commission composed of 5 representatives of the Rwandese Government and 5 of the Rwandese Patriotic Front is established;

The Joint Commission shall have the following mandate:

-To ensure the follow-up of the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement;

-To ensure the follow-up of the implementation of the peace Agreement to be signed at the conclusion of the political negotiations;

NMOG was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire under the control of OAU. On the other hand, JPMC served as an important place for pre-negotiation in Arusha Talk, especially on the military aspects.

However, despite the ceasefire agreement, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the national army of Rwanda, launched a low-intensity guerrilla warfare once again in October 1991, which led to the following resurgence of the RPF.

The final phase of preparation work was coordinated with the low-level involvement of France and the US. For one, Quai d'Orsay's (Minister of Foreign Affairs in France) director for Africa and Maghreb convened a meeting with the GoR¹⁶ Ambassador and the RPF leaders in January 1992, encouraging the RPF to stop fighting

¹⁵ ECGLC refers to "The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries," created by the signing of the Agreement of Gisenyi in Rwanda on September 20, 1976 aiming at regional economic cooperation and integration; it has three members, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire.

¹⁶ GoR refers to "Government of Rwanda".

and the GoR to concede to the RPF's demands. For another, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, met with Ugandan President Museveni and representatives of the RPF, requesting the president to put more pressure on the RPF to bring it back to the negotiating table. With the efforts and pressure of the international community, the first session of the Arusha Talk eventually started in Arusha, the capital of Tanzania on July 12, 1992, ending with the signing of the Arusha Accords on August 4, 1993.

2. Peace Agreements

Signed agreements in Arusha Talks included:

- A. *Amended N'sele Cease-fire Agreement*
- B. *Protocols of agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on*
 - *The Rule of Law*
 - *Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government*
 - *The Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons*
 - *The Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties*
- C. *Arusha Accords*

The amended N'sele Cease-fire Agreement was to assure both parties to keep their promise in compliance with the ceasefire. The Arusha Accords concluded all the previous agreements discussed from 1990 to 1993, being signed with the witness of the international community, as an ending remark to the Arusha Talks. Therefore, in fact, the Protocols of Agreement with its four subtopics was more substantive than the aforementioned two, becoming the focus point of discussion, in particular the most contentious two, *Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government* and *The Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties*.

As stated in *the Rule of Law*, four principles included national unity, democracy, pluralism, human rights, guaranteed equity, freedom of expression, and other fundamental human rights. Besides, the resentment between Hutu and Tutsi was expected to be eradicated as follows:¹⁷

Article III

National unity entails the rejection of all exclusions and any form of discrimination based notably, on ethnicity, region, sex and religion. It also entails that

¹⁷ See "Access to More Information." 1. Peace Agreement between the GoR and the RPF.

all citizens have equal opportunity of access to all the political, economic and other advantages, which access must be guaranteed by the State.

Concerning the worsening refugee problem, *the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons* ensured that the returning rights of displaced Hutu and Tutsi would be well-protected. To put the belief that return is an act of free will into practice, some specialized agencies, in charge of regulating repatriation procedure and offering aid, were established in this protocol, as stated below:¹⁸

Article VIII

The Programme for the Return and the Repatriation shall be designed solely for Rwandese Refugees.

Article XI

The Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, in coordination with Immigration and Emigration Services, shall provide facilities at border posts and at the International airport, for the reception of returnees who shall have opted to go back home with their own means.

As for *Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government*, apart from the structure of the newly-established transitional institutions, the power transfer and exclusion of the CDR¹⁹ were noteworthy. The new framework of government shifted the power from president to parliament, reducing the influence of the MRND²⁰, the ruling party. This irritated President Habyarimana, the leader of MRND, who commented on the protocol as “pieces of paper” sarcastically, and as a consequence, left Arusha in the middle of the talk. Additionally, to heed the RPF’s demand, the Hutu extremists’ party, the CDR was excluded from the newly formed government in case the resentment between ethnicities would be ignited again.

Last but not least, *The Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties*, probably the most thorny and controversial one, focused on the composition of the new National Army and military power-sharing between the GoR and the RPF.²¹ After the lengthy negotiation, the final settlement gave the GoR a sixty–forty advantage in troop composition and developed a power-balance mechanism that the MRND controlled the military, while the RPF controlled the gendarmerie.

3. Analysis of the Position of the GoR and the RPF

Given the internal and external factors, the GoR had no choice but to alter the governance system from single-party politics to multiparty one. In other words, the ruling party had been MRND since President Habyarimana led northern Hutu to usurp

¹⁸ See “Access to More Information.” 1. Peace Agreement between the GoR and the RPF.

¹⁹ CDR refers to “Coalition for the Defence of the Republic,” a political party consisting of Hutu extremists.

²⁰ MRND refers to “Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement,” the ruling political party in Rwanda under President Juvénal Habyarimana.

²¹ See “Access to More Information.” 1. Peace Agreement between the GoR and the RPF.

the power. Because of the collapse of the international coffee market, the domestic economy suffered a recession by a decrease of 40%. Moreover, France and Belgium sent military and economic aids to Rwanda, which propelled the regime to take political reform. Consequently, a number of opposition parties were established, such as MDR(Republican Democratic Movement)²², PSD(Social Democratic Party)²³, PL(Liberal Party)²⁴, and CDR. The multiparty politics not only demonstrated the internal divergence but also diversified the opinions regarding several topics in Arusha Talks, impeding the GoR from taking a strong position. Simply put, moderates like MDR, PSD, and PL supported some reconciliation with the RPF, while hardliners like MRND and CDR adamantly opposed it. For instance, President Habyarimana held different opinions with the Foreign Minister, Ngulinzira, one of the founders of MDR when discussing the composition of the National Army and the power distribution within the BBTG²⁵, leading to the deadlock in the meeting. Repeatedly, President Habyarimana left Arusha, but Ngulinzira remained representing Rwanda, nonetheless, without the consent of the president.

On the other hand, the RPF was more disciplined and united compared to the GoR. The delegation had had a comprehensive plan before the Arusha Talk. During the negotiation process, the RPF often took advantage of its military force as a threat to have the international community and the GoR concede to heed their demands. Eventually, the mismatched level of unity made the Arusha Accord a complete victory for the RPF.

However, despite the Arusha Accords coming into effect, the divergence among Rwandan government officials weakened the influence of the GoR. Some clauses in the Arusha Accords were only agreed upon by part of the delegation of GoR. That is, the GoR would neglect partial clauses and impede the implementation. Rather than compounding the political and military instability with RPF, an internal political reform might be conducted in the first place.

To make matters worse, the exclusion of the Hutu extremists, namely, the CDR, in the BBTG could ignite their resentment and incite crises should the Hutu extremists launch an armed insurrection.

²² MDR refers to the “Republican Democratic Movement,” a political party in Rwanda.

²³ PSD refers to “Social Democratic Party,” a political party in Rwanda.

²⁴ PL refers to “Liberal Party,” a political party in Rwanda.

²⁵ BBTG refers to “Broad-Based Transitional Government,” including the insurgent RPF and the five political parties that had composed a temporary government.

Statement of the Problem

1. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), established in accordance with UNSC Resolution 872 (S/RES/872), was the main UN peacekeeping force responsible for the implementation of the Arusha Accords. As high as its contribution to regional security had been expected, the mandate of UNAMIR was proved too weak to react to any disturbance or non-compliance of the Arusha Accords. The chapter is going to elaborate on the origin of this mission, the preparation phase, and its operation.

A. The Origin of the Mission

Based on “*Paragraph 2: The Neutral International Force*” of “*Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties,*” Rwandan Government and the RPF required a neutral international force as following articles: ²⁶

Article 53

The Neutral International Force shall be under the responsibility and command of the United Nations and shall be composed of contingents provided by countries selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 54

The Neutral International Force shall have the following missions:

- 1. Guarantee the overall security of the country and especially verify the maintenance of law and order by the competent authorities and organs.**
- 4. Assist in the tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country.**

Underlying the appointment of the United Nations to organize the force was the RPF's insistence, who deeply doubted France, a country considered to be intimate to the Government of Rwanda. In addition, the anticipated mandate of the force was laid down in Article 54, but the actual mandate, discussed later, would be distinct from the proposed one.

On October 5, 1993, the Security Council formally introduced the UNAMIR and formulated its mandate in UNSC Resolution 872 as below: ²⁷

- 3. Also decides that, drawing from the Secretary-General's recommendations, the Mission shall have the following mandate:**

²⁶ See “Access to More Information. 1.” Peace Agreement between the GoR and the RPF.

²⁷ See “Access to More Information. 3.” S/RES/872(1993).

(a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city; ...

A comparison between the expected and actual mandate demonstrated the indifferent attitude of the international community, especially those superpowers like the United States and the United Kingdom. Literally, there were two slight but significant differences. For one thing, the former stated that the international force should “guarantee” security, but the latter only asked it to “contribute to” the security, which was ambiguous to what extent the force should contribute, substantially weakening the mandate afterwards. For another, the two parties demanded “the overall security of the country”, while in the resolution was “the security of the city of Kigali”. It wasn’t hard to realize the UN’s intention to keep the UNAMIR small, thus costing as little money as possible.

B. The Preparation Phase

In spite of the deficient mandate, the preparation started with the deployment of the reconnaissance mission, a two-week investigation project in Kigali. The results of the mission revealed that the number of personnel required should range from 5000 to 8000. By the way, the Government of Rwanda and the RPF commonly requested troops of 4260 personnel. However, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that the UNAMIR be composed of 2548 personnel, less than the previous evaluation or the request from the two parties. Under the pressure that most western countries were concerned about the cost, the Secretary-General had no choice but to cut down on the number of personnel.

In addition to the limited size, the composition of the peacekeeping forces and its resources were defective. The sources of armed forces included Belgium, Bangladesh, Ghana, and other neighboring countries. It was noteworthy that Belgium was the only army-contributor among western countries. Besides France, being willing to provide troops but was rejected by the RPF, other western countries refused to get involved in the mission. The western lacked motivation because Rwanda was on nobody’s radar as a place of strategic interest. Even worse, the quality of the troops reduced UNAMIR’s ability to carry out its task. Belgian troops were best-trained and best-equipped but worst-disciplined, while troops from other countries lacked either equipment or training.

C. Operation

In January 1994, most troops successfully gathered in Kigali, ready to carry out the mandate. One of the objectives was to help the installment of the BBTG before December 31, according to the Arusha Agreement, which failed due to political deadlock about the cabinet members list. After the failure to reach a consensus on the arrangement inside the BBTG, a series of violent demonstrations broke out in Kigali in the next year, 1994. Despite the alarming situation, UN headquarters insisted that the UNAMIR was a peacekeeping force under Chapter VI in the UN Charter, which aimed at

seeking a peaceful solution not a powerful combat on local unrest. Dallaire, the force commander of UNAMIR, requested to seize arms six times in early 1994, but all the requests were declined by the headquarters based on the reason that arm raids fell outside the mandate.

One important case was the genocide fax, the first request from Dallaire for armed raids warning of the unfolding genocide. On January 6, UNAMIR received information from Jean Pierre, a trainer of militia in MRND. He claimed that he was asked to localize and make an inventory of all Tutsi in Kigali as well as distribute arms to local Hutus. Dallaire planned to hit arm caches and knocked the genocide-aiming militia off balance within 36 hours. Nevertheless, the reply from the headquarters was that:

“No reconnaissance or other action should be taken by UNAMIR unless clear guidance is received from Headquarters.”

The following guidance was that:

“Seizure of weapons went beyond the mandate of Resolution 872.”

In February, the violent demonstration was exacerbated after the attempt to establish BBTG failed once again. Dallaire sent another request to the headquarters, but the reply was unwavering. Eventually, UNAMIR failed to do any substantial reaction to any heralds of genocide until it took place.

D. Conclusion - the potential problem within UNAMIR

Firstly, the decision-making process was time-wasting. All the important decisions had to follow the guidance of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO), which lowered the motility and efficiency of UNAMIR. The force commander, Dallaire, couldn't even send a telex to the UN headquarters directly, and the only way was to ask the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Booh Booh, to do so.

Secondly, the telex sent to the UN headquarters would first be received by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Annan and Riza. Subsequently, the Under-Secretary-Generals would evaluate the urgency of the incident, deciding whether to forward it to the Secretary General, whose authority was to inform the Security Council.²⁸

Last but not least, the shortcomings in personnel, equipment, ammunition, funding, and support from the international community made the UNAMIR strictly confined. Plus, the limited mandate deprived its ability to quash the unrest or other emergency in Rwanda.

²⁸ See “Access to More Information. 6.” Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the UNAMIR (S/1994/360)

2. The Ineffectiveness of the Security Council

The situation concerning Rwanda was deemed necessary to involve the UN for greater resources, international legitimacy, or broader support. However, the distinct levels of willingness to be involved in the conflict regarding the ambivalence of regional and international priorities were responsible for ineffective implementation. That is, the OAU, as a regional organization, was keen to resolve the conflict to secure regional stability, whereas the UN demonstrated a lower willingness.

The inadequate international support can be traced back to the extensive atrocities of the Yugoslav Civil War and the Somali Civil War of the early 1990s. Known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), most UN peacekeeping troops were sent off to Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, resulting in insufficient resources and finances for the UNAMIR.

On top of that, UN peacekeeping forces can face even more intense challenges. When the Security Council decides to deploy peacekeeping missions, it usually takes three to six months on average for the troops to arrive and begin their mission. As troops are composed of personnel from various countries, they have never trained together or acquired the same operational procedures. Further, adding to the remote location of Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping mission encountered great logistical challenges, deepening the reticence among countries to support UN operations.

Even though the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace, given that the five permanent members of the Security Council are superior in determining the adoption of resolutions, their discrepancies in political will have led to their indifference as well as the inaction of the Security Council with regard to the situation concerning Rwanda.

As the UN is often the only entity willing or able to provide humanitarian assistance before or during times of crisis, yet without its own troops and heavily relying on UN Member States, UN Member States, especially those of the Security Council, shall possess a responsibility to support the UN peace operations system and deliberate feasibility of providing assistance. Rather, the lack of such formal obligations of Member States has been detrimental to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping mandate so far.

Major Rwandan Parties Involved

Because the ethnicities involved in this issue may still seem confusing after reading the foregoing condensed contemporary issues, the Dais tried to again finalize all the major parties, both the Hutus and the Tutsis, involved in this topic issue as follows, in hopes of helping delegates clarify their allocated stances.

1. Hutu Extremists

A. Hutu Power

The ethnic tension, purposely aroused by the European colonizers, had been worsening since then. The first elected president Grégoire Kayibanda, an ethnic Hutu, used ethnic tensions to preserve his own power. After brutally overthrowing Kayibanda, President Habyarimana came to his time as dictator. Ethnic conflicts were inflamed and deepened to consolidate President Habyarimana's position and to face economic hardship and the threat from the RPF. The era of President Habyarimana can arguably be the apex of "Hutu Power", an extreme ideology²⁹. Its concepts can be seen from "Hutu Ten Commandments"³⁰. The following are some examples:

4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority.

6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be of the Hutu majority.

7. The Rwandan Armed Forces must be exclusively Hutu. The war experience in 1990 teaches us this lesson. No military man should marry a Tutsi woman.

8. The Bahutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi.

9. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must be united, interdependent and worried about their Bahutu brothers' fate.

Besides, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) was a radio station controlled by the Hutu government. It had been projecting hate propaganda against Tutsis since July 1993, also contributing to the hostility between the two groups. It can be seen that the relationship between Hutu and Tutsis was worsening because of deliberate propaganda, education, and policies.

²⁹ Allan T. Moore, Ph.D, "Words and Power in Conflict: Rwanda under MRND Rule." NSUWorks. <https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol27/iss2/5/>.

³⁰ Panel set 2.AI, <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/assets/pdf/exhibits/Panel-Set2.pdf>.

B. Akazu

Akazu, also named Zero Network, was an unofficial organization composed of Hutu extremists intending to build a non-Tutsi Rwanda. They contributed to the development of Hutu Power ideology and fanned resentment against the Tutsi during the 1990s. Some scholars believe their radical ideology and massacres were an effort to hold on to the political power they had gathered when President Habyarimana came to power in a military coup against the elected government.

2. The Moderate Hutus

While the majority of Hutus were initially aligned with the extremist Hutu Power, there were moderate Hutus that opposed the violence of the anti-Tutsi sentiments disseminated by Hutu extremists.

Case in point, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) was a political party established by President Habyarimana in 1975 and had been the only legal party in Rwanda since the adoption of the new constitution in 1978. Its army was an important force in the fight against the RPF. However, while initially extreme, in the 1990s during the Rwandan Civil War, President Habyarimana became increasingly liberal when he started losing international support and monopoly on politics, allowing opposition parties to be formed and negotiating with the Tutsi rebels of the RPF.

One of the notable parties led by the moderate Hutus, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR), was established in 1991. Mostly, the moderate Hutus were in support of President Habyarimana's intention to sign a peace deal, which disappointed the Hutu extremists perpetrating hatred towards the Tutsi and in turn formed different bloc positions within the Hutu community.

3. Tutsi Groups

In 1979, Tutsis exiled in Uganda established the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), and in 1987 changed into the RPF, with its main pleas being:

To promote national unity and recolonisation; To establish genuine democracy; To provide security for all Rwandese; To build an integrated and self-sustaining economy; To eradicate corruption in all forms To repatriate and resettle Rwandese refugees; To devise and implement policies that promote the social welfare of all Rwandese and; To pursue a foreign policy based on equality, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit between Rwanda and other countries.

The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), was indeed involved in several regional conflicts, helping the RPF build relationships with other rebel groups and governments in Uganda. In 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda³¹. Although the RPF and MRND had multiple times of negotiations, the civil war didn't come to a temporary halt until the Arusha Accord was signed in 1993.

³¹ Republic of Rwanda, "About the Government of Rwanda." <https://www.gov.rw/about>.

Key Actors of the International Community

1. Belgium

When the Arusha Accords included the deployment of a "neutral international force", Belgium was willing to help implement the Arusha Accords by participating in this mission, acting as a zealous contributor to UNAMIR. However, as it is UN doctrine that former colonial powers do not participate in peacekeeping missions to the respective countries, the Belgian offer was seen as a mixed blessing. From the investigation of the Senate, it has become clear that Belgium received an official informal request from the United Nations to participate in the UNAMIR.³² The Senate concluded that Belgium was recommended to be the Western provider of troops because of its traditional bond with Rwanda, the positive achievements of Belgium in previous peacekeeping missions, and the reason that both the RPF and the Rwandan government had insisted hereon.

Still, the Belgian participation was heavily criticized. The MRND, comprised of Hutu extremists, resisted Belgian participation since it suspected Belgium of being biased and pro-RPF. The main reason for this opinion was the Belgian refusal to deliver weapons during the Rwandan Civil War in 1990. Further, Plus, Belgium's colonial history and the bad behavior of the Belgian soldiers caused hatred among the population, leading to the anti-Belgian atmosphere along with the danger it could create for the Belgian peacekeepers, thereby the backlash against them weakened the installed peacekeeping mission.

2. France

France, strictly opposing the RPF, extensively supported President Habyarimana's government. On account of the support for the Hutu from France, she even involved in arms trading with the Hutu government well into the 1990s, and French military advisors trained the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), presumably for the sake of the reinforcement and expansion of France's power and influence in Africa. By prioritizing the stability of its ally, France was criticized that she ignored the rising tide of ethnic extremes and acted indifferently to addressing the ethnic hostilities, yet pursuing her interests, including the stockpiling of weapons and the dissemination of Hutu propaganda.³³

3. United States of America

As the primary contributor to the peacekeeping mission of the Somali War, the US-led intervention eventually led to failure along with the reduction of US military forces. The results coincided with calls asking the UN to conduct peacekeeping operations for wiser, more prudent, and conditional use. Therefore, President Bill

³² Grünfeld, F., & Huijboom, A, *The Failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda the role of bystanders.*

³³ Grünfeld, F., & Huijboom, A, *The Failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda the role of bystanders.*

Clinton repeatedly and deliberately refused to act immediately, adding to the domestic pressures to avoid risking American lives for what was perceived as "internal African conflicts."³⁴ The United States was hesitant to commit to another complex humanitarian intervention, especially one that lacked strong international support and clear operational mandates.

³⁴ Barnett, Michael, "The United Nations Security Council and Rwanda", 2-4.

Questions to Consider

1. What attributed the situation concerning Rwanda to a crisis?
2. Why were the mandates of UNAMIR too weak to address the situation concerning Rwanda? Did your countries support a stronger mandate? If yes, how could the Security Council reinforce it before or during the crisis? If not, what was the reason for your country's decision?
3. As discussed above, the regional countries and organizations, like the OAU, were more willing than western countries to tackle the situation concerning Rwanda. Would it be possible for the Security Council to integrate regional powers for help?
4. Given that the time of this conference was set on 1 March 1994, what methods could your country carry out to address the situation concerning Rwanda?

Access to More Information

1. Peace Agreement between the GoR and the RPF.
2. S/RES/846(1993)
3. S/RES/872(1993)
4. S/RES/909(1994)
5. S/RES/912(1994)
6. Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the UNAMIR (S/1994/360).
7. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UNAMIR (S/1994/470).

These documents have been uploaded to google drive, the link, Access to More Information.

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1zPua8ABLkdEARUU7ArbLzFXd3bjIXQTH>

Assignment

Please write a position paper of the country you represent, and send your assignment to **the Google Drive folder:** https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1RN_I9WV99w6ulXhsbeIFddPNq8qHIFa before **23:59 January 5th, 2025**. All assignments should be handed in as Word documents (12pt, Times New Roman, single-spaced) and saved as “Country-Name-School.” Delegates should not amend anyone’s document in the folder.

Please be reminded that works plagiarized from the Internet, generative AI (i.e., ChatGPT), or other delegates, violating the format, or late on the submission will NOT be checked and recognized. Those who violate the rules will NOT receive any awards.

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